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NICOLAS L. JACQUET
SERENE TAN
Money, Bargaining, and Risk Sharing
We investigate the dual role of money as a self-insurance device and a means
of payment when perfect risk sharing is not possible, and when the two roles
of money are disentangled. We use a variant of Lagos–Wright (2005) where
agents face a risk in the centralized market (CM): in the decentralized market
(DM) money’s main role is as a means of payment, while in the CM it is
as a self-insurance device. We show that state-contingent inflation rates can
improve agents’ ability to self-insure in the CM, thereby improving the
terms of trade in the DM. We then characterize the optimal monetary policy.
JEL codes: C78, E40, E52
Keywords: risk sharing, monetary policy, bargaining.
THIS PAPER INVESTIGATES THE dual role of money as a self-
insurance device (store of value) and a means of payment when institutional arrange-
ments do not allow for perfect risk sharing because the set of securities is incomplete
and the implementation of risk sharing contracts is limited by a lack of commitment.
A number of studies, like Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Reed and Waller (2006),
have suggested that when it is costless to hold money it is possible to obtain perfect
risk sharing. These studies, however, have in common two related features.
First, the two roles of money as a means of payment and as a savings device cannot
be separated: if one shuts down the idiosyncratic risk agents face in these models1
there would naturally not be any role for money as a self-insurance device, but there
would also not be any trade, which means money would not have a role as a means
of payment either.
Second, in these studies all markets are perfectly competitive. However, a standard
way to obtain money being essential is to have a fraction of the trades take place in
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a decentralized market (DM), and the terms of trade there are determined through
Nash bargaining. Previous work by Lagos and Wright (2005), Rocheteau and Wright
(2005), Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007), and Craig and Rocheteau (2008),
among others, have shown in the Lagos–Wright framework (LW thereafter) that
when some markets are decentralized and the terms of trade there are determined by
Nash bargaining, trade will always be inefficient. In fact, agents never bring enough
real balances because of a bargaining inefficiency. This suggests that if some of the
risk faced by agents is at a time where markets were decentralized, perfect risk sharing
might not be feasible. Even if the risk faced by agents is in a market with competitive
pricing, it might not be feasible to obtain perfect risk sharing either if trade in another
subperiod is decentralized.
How different would risk sharing be if not all markets were centralized, and how
important is it that the two roles of money be so tightly linked? To answer these
questions we consider an environment where some trades are decentralized and
where the two roles of money are disentangled. We adopt an overlapping-generations
version of the LW framework,2 except that depending on whether agents turn out to
be buyers or sellers in the subperiods where trade is decentralized, the DM, agents
face different shocks to their disutility of effort in the following subperiod where
trade is centralized, the CM. Hence, the principal role of money in the DM is its
means of payment role, while its principal role in the CM is its ability to serve as a
self-insurance device. This enables us to consider the interaction between the hedging
properties of money and its role as a means of payment, and in particular we consider
the welfare gains from a state-dependent monetary policy.
In our environment, when the monetary policy rule induces a constant inflation rate,
agents do not completely self-insure, even if it is costless to hold money, because the
returns from trade in the DM for buyers are larger than what they could gain in the next
CM by holding on to their money. Moreover, the quantity of goods traded in the DM
fails to maximize the instantaneous surplus from trade there because of the standard
bargaining inefficiency associated with the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
We then show that monetary policy rules that make the value of money, and
therefore the inflation rate, state-contingent improve agents’ ability to insure against
the shock in the CM, which is not very surprising: sellers are the recipient of money
in the DM, and they are therefore the ones going into the CM with money holdings.
Since sellers are the ones facing the risk in their disutility of effort, they can benefit
from a state-dependent value of money relative to a constant value. The way in which
this is done is for the monetary authority to have the price of money (in terms of CM
good) being low (high) when sellers face a low (high) disutility of effort. This means
that when the value of money is state dependent in this way, sellers value money
more than buyers.
A less obvious result of our paper is that the very fact that money becomes a better
hedging device for sellers in the CM makes money a better means of payments in
the DM by improving the terms of trade: for a given cost of holding money, sellers
2. Similar structures blending the overlapping-generations structure with the LW framework can be
found in Zhu (2008) and Waller (2008).
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value money more and are therefore willing to produce more for the same quantity
of real balances. We show that it is possible to design a monetary policy rule that
eliminates the usual bargaining inefficiency in the DM that delivers that the quantity
traded is below y∗, the quantity that maximizes the instantaneous surplus from trade
there, even when it is costly to hold money. In fact, we show that when the monetary
authority carries out the “right” state-dependent monetary policy that agents will
trade y∗ in the DM. This can be achieved because sellers’ valuation of money can
be made increasingly higher than that of buyers, which in turns increases the total
surplus of the match, and even if buyers do not extract the entire surplus, the fact
that the total surplus increases means that both buyers and sellers can be made better
off. Hence, improving the hedging properties of money also improves its means of
payment properties.
We then characterize the optimal monetary policy rule, and show that it induces a
quantity traded in the DM greater than y∗. This is because at this quantity the marginal
cost of going beyond y∗ is zero, while the marginal gains from improving further the
hedging properties of money are strictly positive.
There are three papers that are especially related to ours. Reed and Waller (2006)
also consider a variant of the LW framework where agents face uninsurable risks.
In their paper, the risk that agents face is a consumption risk due to shocks to their
endowments, and they ask whether money can play the role of insuring against
consumption risk. One important difference is, as mentioned earlier, that in their
model the two roles of money as means of payment and self-insurance device are
intertwined, while our model disentangles them. Also, in their paper, all markets are
perfectly competitive. Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007) analyze the bargaining
inefficiency and discuss when the hold-up problem (with holding money) arises, while
Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010) show that in the standard LW framework,
fiscal and monetary policy can overcome the bargaining inefficiency characterizing
trade in the DM through the introduction of an appropriate production subsidy or
sales tax in the DM. We instead show that when the monetary authority carries out
the “right” state-dependent monetary policy that agents will trade y∗ in the DM.
This paper is organized as follows. The environment is laid out in Section 1,
and the social planner’s problem is studied in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibrium, and Section 4 presents the welfare gains resulting from state-dependent
monetary policy rules. Section 5 concludes. In the interest of space, all proofs are
omitted and grouped in a separate technical appendix.3
1. THE MODEL
1.1 Physical Environment
We consider an economy where time is discrete and continues forever. Each time
period is divided into two subperiods. In each subperiod agents produce, trade, and
3. This technical appendix can be found on our personal homepages at http://sites.google.
com/site/nljacquet/ and http://sites.google.com/site/serenetaneconomics/homepage.
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FIG. 1. Timeline.
consume a good, which is nonstorable across subperiods. As in Lagos and Wright
(2005), one important difference between the subperiods of each period is that trade
in the first subperiod is done in a Walrasian market, whereas in the second subperiod
agents are anonymous and matched bilaterally and an agent can trade only with the
agent he is matched with. For this reason, we will, with a slight abuse of language,
term the first subperiod the centralized market (CM), and the second subperiod is
termed the DM. In addition to the nonstorable good, there is a perfectly divisible and
storable object that we call fiat money.
We assume that just before the beginning of a period, the economy is subject
to a shock x with two possible realizations, 1 and 2. The shock is identically and
independently distributed across time, and the probability that x = 1 is α ∈ (0, 1) and
x = 2 with complementary probability 1 − α.
1.2 Agents
There are two types of agents, which we call buyers and sellers because of what
they do in the DM, and we index buyers and sellers by b and s, respectively. All
agents are born at the beginning of a CM after the realization of the shock and live for
three subperiods. That is, agents die after the second CM of their lives. A unit mass
of agents is born at each period t, half of them are buyers and half of them are sellers.
These agents are Generation t agents. We say that agents are young in the first period
of their lives, and they are old in the second period of their lives. We hence obtain
that at each CM, there is a mass two of agents, old and young buyers and sellers,
while in each DM there is a unit mass of agents since only young agents are alive
(see Figure 1) . Without loss of generality, agents discount across time periods but
not across subperiods. Let β be the discount factor.
In the DM, buyers can only consume and sellers can only produce. The utility
of consuming y units of the good in the DM for buyers is u(y) and the cost of
producing y units of the good for sellers is c(y). We assume that u(0) = c(0) = 0,
that both u and c are strictly increasing, that u(y) − c(y) is strictly concave, and that
u′(0) = +∞. Buyers and sellers are randomly matched and the terms of trade in the
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DM are determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution where buyers have
bargaining power θ ∈ (0, 1].
In the CM when old, both types of agents consume and produce, and each unit
of effort translates into the production of one unit of the good. The preferences are
quasi-linear with the linearity in the disutility of effort ĥ, and the utility to an agent in
consuming q̂ units of the good is U (̂q), with U strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Their disutility of effort is state dependent, and we denote by ηix the marginal disutility
of effort when the state of the world is x for agents of type i ∈ {b, s}. We assume that
for i ∈ {b, s},
αηi1 + (1 − α)ηi2 = 1, (1)
so that in expected terms sellers have the same marginal disutility of effort as buyers,
and that ηs1 < 1 < η2s, and ηs1 < ηb1.4 Finally, we assume that limq̂→+∞ U ′ (̂q) < ηs1.
This shock structure admits three subcases: one, where buyers’ marginal disutility
of effort is constant, that is, ηb1 = ηb2 = 1; another, where their marginal disutility of
effort moves in opposite directions from that of sellers, that is, ηs1 ≤ ηb2 < 1 < ηb1 ≤
ηs2; and another, where buyers’ marginal disutility moves in the same way as that of
sellers but with a smaller amplitude, that is, ηs1 < ηb1 < 1 < ηb2 < η2s. Note that the
second subcase when ηs1 = ηb2 and ηb1 = ηs2 corresponds to an environment without
aggregate uncertainty.5 In order to keep the presentation of the mechanism making
money a better means of payment in this paper as simple as possible, our analysis
focuses on the first subcase where buyers have a constant marginal disutility of effort,
ηb1 = ηb2 = 1, so only sellers have a variable marginal disutility of effort as ηs1 < 1 <
ηs2.
Buyers in the first CM of their lives have the same utility function U(q) − h as
when they are old, while young sellers can consume but cannot work, and their utility
of consuming q units of consumption is also U(q). The expected lifetime utility of a
buyer of generation t when the state of the world in t is x is thus
U (qt (x)) − ht (x) + u(yt (x)) + βEx̂ [U (̂qt+1(̂x)) − ĥt+1(̂x)],
while that of a seller is
U (qt (x)) − c(yt (x)) + βEx̂ [U (̂qt+1(̂x)) − ηsx̂ ĥt+1(̂x)],
where “hats” indicate variables when the agent is old.
We assume that agents are anonymous in the DM so that credit is not feasible, and
therefore money is essential for trade in the DM. Furthermore, since we assume that
agents are born after the shock x is realized, young and old agents cannot write risk
sharing contracts for that CM. Finally, the overlapping-generations structure implies
4. The case where ηs1 > η1b is symmetric.
5. In this case, since αηi1 + (1 − α)ηi2 = 1 for both i, α must be equal to 0.5.
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that risk sharing contracts among agents of the same generation are not feasible either.
Agents of differing types in a given generation cannot insure each other either since
agents can default at no cost; the fact that agents die at the end of their third subperiod
means an agent who does not deliver in the CM while old, the goods he was supposed
to cannot be punished, for instance, by being excluded from trading, as in Kehoe and
Levine (1993, 2001). The absence of risk sharing contracts to complete the set of
markets in the CM means money has a role for self-insurance.
1.3 Money Supply and Monetary Policy
The stock of money is controlled by the central bank, which introduces (withdraws)
money by lump-sum transfers (taxes) to young buyers in the CM. We focus on
stationary monetary policy rules where the gross growth rate of the money stock
across any two consecutive CMs is given by the state in the latter of the two CMs,
that is, Mt+1(xt+1|Mt) = γ (xt+1)Mt, with γ (xt+1) ≥ β for xt+1 = 1, 2. Agents always
spend all their money in the last CM of their lives, while the fact that the shock x is
iid means that all young agents always face the same problem. It is therefore natural
to look for an equilibrium where young agents’ demand for real balances is constant,
so that the stock of real balances is constant across time and state, that is, for all xt
and xt ′ ,
φt (xt )Mt (xt ) = φt ′(xt ′)Mt ′(xt ′).
This implies that for all xt and xt ′ such that Mt (xt ) = Mt ′(xt ′), φt (xt ) = φt ′(xt ′ ), that
is the price of money in a given period depends on the stock of money in that period
(and the expected inflation rate). We therefore directly use the stock of money as the
state variable for the price of money, that is, we denote by φ(M) the value of money
in a given period when the stock of money in that period is M. Note that if in a period
the realization of the state is x, then the inflation rate between last CM and this CM
when the state is x is
φ(M−1)
φ(M(x)) =
φ(M−1)
φ(γ (x)M−1)
= γ (x),
where M−1 is the stock of money last period. There are thus only two possible inflation
rates given our choice of the monetary rule.
1.4 Remarks
We are interested in the dual roles of money as a means of payment and as a self-
insurance tool, and therefore the choice of having two subperiods where the role of
money in each subperiod is different, like in LW, is natural. However, the overlapping-
generations structure means that we would not have a problem of keeping track of
the distribution of money that arises without the LW framework (with subperiods in
each period and quasi-linear preferences in one of the two subperiods) even without
quasi-linearity of preferences in the CM. We choose to use quasi-linear preferences
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for the CM because it simplifies greatly the terms of trade in the DM by eliminating
wealth effects.
The utility representation of preferences in the CM is quasi-linear for old agents
(like for young buyers). However, although old and young buyers are risk neutral
with respect to their effort choice, old sellers are not. In fact, consider the following
two effort choices for an old seller. In the first case he exerts effort h in both states,
while in the second case he exerts effort hx in state x, with αh1 + (1 − α)h2 = h
and h1 > h2, so that the old seller’s expected effort is the same in both scenarios.
In the first case his expected disutility of effort is αηs1h + (1 − α)ηs2h = h, while in
the second case it is αηs1h1 + (1 − α)ηs2h2 < h.6 So, clearly, sellers do not care only
about the expected effort they exert when old, contrary to buyers, and this is because
their marginal disutility of effort varies with the state.
2. THE SOCIAL PLANNER’S PROBLEM
We consider the case of a utilitarian social planner who can directly instruct agents
how much to consume or to work,7 and puts weight 1 on agents who are initially old
and weight β t on agents from generation t ≥ 0. Its objective function is thus
W = E0
∫
j∈B−1
[
U (̂q0( j)) − ĥ0( j)
]
d j + E0
∫
j∈S−1
[
U (̂q0( j)) − ηsx0 ĥ0( j)
]
d j
+E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
∫
j∈Bt
{
U (qt ( j)) − ht ( j) + u(yt ( j)) + β[U (̂qt+1( j)) − ĥt+1( j)]
}
d j
+E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
∫
j∈St
{
U (qt ( j)) − c(yt ( j)) + β
[
U (̂qt+1( j)) − ηsxt+1 ĥt+1( j)
]}
d j ,
(2)
where Bt and St denote the set of buyers and sellers from Generation t, respectively,
and it is understood that the quantities at each date can be dependent on the state at
that date. The first line corresponds to the welfare of the initially old agents, while the
second and third lines correspond, respectively, to the welfare of buyers and sellers
from Generation 0 onward.
The resource constraints the social planner faces in the CM of each period t ≥ 0
are∫
j∈Bt−1∪St−1
q̂t ( j)d j +
∫
j∈Bt ∪St
qt ( j)d j ≤
∫
j∈Bt−1∪St−1
ĥt ( j)d j +
∫
j∈Bt
ht ( j)d j , (3)
6. Using the fact that (1 − α)ηs2 = 1 − αη1s, we obtain that αηs1h1 + (1 − α)ηs2h2 = αηs1(h1 − h2) +
h2. However, α(h1 − h2) = h −h2, so αηs1(h1 − h2) + h2 = ηs1h + (1 − ηs1)h2, which is strictly less than h
since h2 < h.
7. We consider the Ramsey problem in Section 4.2.
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while in the DM of time period t ≥ 0 it is
yt ( j) ≤ yt ( j ′) for all ( j, j ′) ∈ Mt , (4)
where Mt ⊂ Bt × St is the set of matches in the DM of period t. Furthermore,
the effort of each agent must be nonnegative. The feasibility constraints (3) simply
state that the total quantity consumed in the CM of period t is no more than the total
quantity produced in the respective CM, and the constraint ( 4) states that the quantity
consumed by each buyer in the DM of a given period t is no more than what the seller
he is matched with produces.
Clearly the social planner’s problem, which is to maximize (2) subject to (3) and
(4), is a succession of static problems, one for each subperiod of each period. The
social planner’s choice for the DM consumption and production for agents in any
given match is yt(j) = yt(j′) = y∗ such that u′(y∗) = c′(y∗). Finally, the first-order
conditions for the social planner’s problem in the CM of any given period t yield that
for all ( j, j ′) ∈ (Bt−1 ∪ St−1) × (Bt ∪ St ),
U ′ (̂qt ( j)) = U ′(qt ( j ′)) = min{1, ηsxt },
so that all agents consume the same in the CM; and only agents with the lowest
marginal disutility of effort work.
It is worth noting that there are two dimensions of risk sharing in our environment,
risk sharing in consumption and risk sharing in effort, both for the CM. In fact, old
sellers face a shock to their marginal disutility of effort, while buyers do not, and
in state 1 old sellers face a lower marginal cost of effort than buyers, while it is the
contrary in state 2. Hence, to perfectly share the risk in effort cost, old sellers should
be the only ones producing in state 1, while in state 2 it is the buyers. The effort
the agents who are producing should exert is determined by the fact that perfect risk
sharing in consumption implies that all agents consume the same quantity in a given
state, and the marginal cost of effort of those working equals the marginal utility of
consumption of all agents.
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
3.1 Last Subperiod of an Agent’s Life
Since each agent lives for three subperiods, we solve the problem of each type of
agent by starting from the last period of their lives. Denoting by Vi(m, M, x) the value
of entering the CM for an old agent of type i ∈ {b, s} with m units of money when
the state of the world is x and the stock of money is M, we have that for a buyer
V b(m, M, x) = max
(q,h)
{U (q) − h},
s.t. q = h + φ(M)m, q, h ≥ 0.
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Here, M is an aggregate state variable because the price of money in the CM depends
on the stock of money in that period. It turns out that the state of the economy x does
not matter for an old buyer’s decisions directly, although it does matter indirectly
since x determines the value of M given M−1, the stock of money in the last CM, as
M = γ (x)M−1. Assuming an interior solution for h,8 an assumption that we maintain
throughout the paper, we obtain that Vb(m, M, x) can be rewritten as
V b(m, M, x) = φ(M)m + max
q
{U (q) − q},
so that the optimal consumption choice and implied effort choice for an old buyer
of generation t − 1 are q̂b(m, M, x) = q∗(1) where for all η, q∗(η) is such that
U′(q∗(η)) = η, and ĥb(m, M, x) = q∗(1) − φ(M)m, respectively. This implies that
V b(m | M−1), the expected value for an old buyer of entering the CM with m units of
money given that the stock of money was M−1 last period, is linear in m and can be
written as
V b(m | M−1) = V b(0 | M−1) + φe(M−1)m, (5)
where
V b(0 | M−1) = U (q∗(1)) − q∗(1), and
φe(M−1) ≡ [α/γ (x = 1) + (1 − α)/γ (x = 2)] φ−1(M−1)
is the expected marginal value of money to a buyer given the stock of money last
period was M−1, with φ−1(M−1) being the price of money in the previous period given
M−1. In fact, with probability α the state next period is x = 1, in which case the money
stock will be γ (x = 1)M−1, implying the price of money will be φ−1(M−1)/γ (x = 1),
and with probability 1 − α the state next period is x = 2, in which case the money
stock will be γ (x = 2)M−1, implying the price of money will be φ−1(M−1)/γ (x = 2).
For a seller, his problem in the last CM of his life is
V s(m, M, x) = max
(q,h)
{
U (q) − ηsx h
}
,
s.t. q = h + φ(M)m, q, h ≥ 0.
Assuming an interior solution for h as well, Vs(m, M, x) can be rewritten as
V s(m, M, x) = ηsxφ(M)m + maxq
{
U (q) − ηsx q
}
.
The optimal consumption choice and implied effort choice for an old seller are
therefore q̂s(m, M, x) = q∗(ηsx ), and ĥs(m, M, x) = q∗(ηsx ) − φ(M)m, respectively.
8. The interiority of the solution for q is guaranteed by the assumption that U′(0) = +∞.
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This implies that V s(m | M−1), the expected value for an old seller of entering the
CM with m units of money left from the DM, is linear in m and can be written as
V s(m | M−1) = V s(0 | M−1) + −1φe(M−1)m, (6)
where
V s(0 | M−1) = Ex
[
U (q∗(ηsx )) − ηsx q∗(ηsx ))
]
and
 ≡ 1
ηs1ω + ηs2(1 − ω)
is the valuation of money by a buyer relative to that of a seller, where ω ≡ αγ (x =
2)/(αγ (x = 2) + (1 − α)γ (x = 1)). Note that if the monetary policy is state indepen-
dent, then γ (x = 2) = γ (x = 1), which implies that  = 1; that is, buyers and sellers
value money the same way. If, however, γ (x = 2) < γ (x = 1), then  < 1, and sellers
value money more than buyers, and vice versa if γ (x = 2) > γ (x = 1).
3.2 Terms of Trade in the DM
We now turn our attention to the DM. The value for a buyer of entering the DM
with a quantity m of money is
W b(m, M) = u(y(m, M)) + βV b(m − d(m, M) | M), (7)
where y(m, M) and d(m, M) are, respectively, the quantity of good purchased and the
quantity of money transferred to the seller given that the buyer entered the DM with
m and the stock of money is M. Note that we are assuming that the terms of trade are
independent of the seller’s money holdings, which is true as long as the solution for h
in the CM for old sellers is interior. Then, using (5), we have that the surplus obtained
by a buyer from trading in the DM a quantity y of the good against an amount d of
money, is
u(y) + βV b(m − d | M) − βV b(m | M) = u(y) − βφe+1(M)d.
For a seller with money holdings m, his value in the DM when he meets a buyer in
period t with money holdings m˜ is
W s(m, m˜ | M) = −c(y(m˜, M)) + βV s(m + d(m˜, M) | M), (8)
which, using (6), yields that the surplus to a seller from trade in the DM is
−c(y) + βV s(m + d | M) − βV s(m | M) = −c(y) + β−1φe+1(M)d.
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The terms of trade (y(m, M), d(m, M)) when a buyer has money holdings m and
the stock of money is M are the solution to9
max
(y,d)
[
u(y) − βφe+1(M)d
]θ [−c(y) + β−1φe+1(M)d]1−θ ,
subject to d ≤ m.
The first-order conditions of the maximization problem are
FOC (y) : θu′(y) [u(y) − βφe+1(M)d]θ−1 [−c(y) + β−1φe+1(M)d]1−θ
= (1 − θ )c′(y) [u(y) − βφe+1(M)d]θ [−c(y) + β−1φe+1(M)d]−θ ; (9)
FOC (d) : θβφe+1(M)
[
u(y) − βφe+1(M)d
]θ−1 [−c(y) + β−1φe+1(M)d]1−θ + μ
= (1 − θ )β−1φe+1(M)
[
u(y) − βφe+1(M)d
]θ [−c(y) + β−1φe+1(M)d]−θ ,
(10)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint on the quantity of money d
transferred. We then have the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. Given , when a buyer enters the DM with m units of money when the stock
of money is M, the terms of trade in the DM (y(m, M; ), d(m, M; )) are such that
y(m, M ; ) =
{
Y (m, M ; ), if m < m∗(M ; );
y∗(), otherwise,
and d(m, M ; ) =
{
m, if m < m∗(M ; );
m∗(M ; ), otherwise,
where y∗() solves u′(y) = c′(y) ,
m∗(M ; ) = [θc(y∗()) + (1 − θ )−1u(y∗())]/ (βφe+1(M)) ,
and Y(m, M; ) solves βφe+1(M)m = 
(y; )with

(y; ) =  θu
′(y)c(y) + (1 − θ )u(y)c′(y)
θu′(y) + (1 − θ )c′(y) . (11)
9. As mentioned earlier, although the quasi-linearity of preferences in the CM is not necessary for the
problem to be tractable, this assumption simplifies the analysis of the bargaining game. This is because the
value functions for the CM are then linear in money, which then enables us to obtain simple expressions
characterizing the terms of trade.
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If the monetary policy rule is such that the value of money in the CM φ is state
independent, since then  = 1, the terms of trade are exactly as in LW: if buyers
have the quantity of money m∗(M; 1) they can purchase the quantity y∗(1) = y∗ from
buyers that maximizes the total instantaneous surplus in the DM, S(y) = u(y) − c(y).
But if they have less then they are constrained, in which case they give away all their
money holdings to sellers in exchange for the quantity of goods Y(m, M; 1) < y∗.
If, however, the monetary policy rule is such that the price of money in the CM
is state dependent, then buyers and sellers do not value money the same way, and
it is then possible that buyers purchase more than the quantity y∗ in the DM today.
Suppose that money is worth more in state 2 than in state 1 in the next CM. Then
sellers value money more than buyers, that is,  < 1, and we then obtain that in the
DM today they trade y∗() > y∗ if the buyer is not constrained. This is intuitive.
When sellers value money more than buyers, the total surplus from trade in the DM
is greater than the total instantaneous surplus. We can see this from the total surplus
of a match, which can be obtained by adding up the surpluses accruing to the buyer
and the seller,
u(y) − c(y) + (−1 − 1)βφe+1(M)d.
In addition to the instantaneous gains from trade in the DM, S(y) = u(y) − c(y),
there are gains from trade that will be realized in the next CM, (−1 − 1)βφe+1(M)d,
because the transfer of money from buyers to sellers is a transfer of an object from
agents who value it relatively less to those who value it relatively more.
Let us now explain in detail where these additional gains from trade are coming
from. One unit of money brought into the CM when old will enable a buyer to
purchase φ+1(M+1) units of consumption when the stock of money is M+1, which
saves him from supplying φ+1(M+1) units of effort. Since old buyers have a constant
marginal disutility of effort of 1 in the CM, the expected value of one unit of money
in the next CM is αφ+1(γ (x = 1)M) × 1 + (1 − α)φ+1(γ (x = 2)M) × 1 = φe+1(M),
which in the DM is worth βφe+1(M). Now consider the seller’s valuation of a unit of
money. This unit of money will also enable him to consume φ+1(M+1) units in the
following CM when the stock of money is M+1 , and it saves him from supplying
φ+1(M+1) units of effort. His valuation of a unit of money is thus
αφt+1(γ (x = 1)M) × ηs1 + (1 − α)φt+1(γ (x = 2)M) × ηs2 = −1φe+1(M),
which in the DM is worth β−1φe+1(M) to him. Hence, when the buyer gives one
unit of money to the seller, the present value of the gains from trade to be realized in
the following CM are (−1 − 1)βφe+1(M). We term these extra gains from trade risk
sharing in effort cost. As we will make clear later on, old sellers are in effect insured
in the CM by young buyers. These gains from trade would not exist if buyers were to
hold on to their money in the DM since old and young buyers face the same marginal
cost of effort in each state.
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Note that because we have assumed interiority of the effort choice in the CM, the
only risk sharing gains arising from a state-dependent monetary policy are related to
the effort cost risk. If, however, the effort choice of old sellers were to reach a corner
in the CM in one state, then the state-dependent monetary policy would in addition
induce risk sharing gains from consumption.
3.3 The First CM and the Money Holding Decision
The problem a young agent faces in the first CM of his life is to choose how much
to consume, work, and how much money to hold for the DM in order to maximize
his expected discounted lifetime utility. Since young sellers cannot work, they cannot
consume nor bring money into the DM. For a young buyer, his maximization problem
when the state of the world is x and the stock of money is M is
max
(q,h,m)
{U (q) − h + W b(m, M)}
s.t. q + φ(M)m = h + T bx ,
where Tbx is the real transfer received by a young buyer when the state of the world is
x. Assuming an interior solution for h, the problem can be rewritten more simply as
max
q
{U (q) − q} + T bx + max
m
{−φ(M)m + W b(m, M)}.
It is clear that a young buyer chooses to consume q∗(1) in both states of the world,
and the amount he chooses to work depends on the current state of the world through
the value of the transfer, and on his choice of money holdings to acquire: hb(m, M,
x) = q∗(1) + φ(M)m − Tbx .
Replacing Wb(m, M) by its expression in (7), and combining it with (5), we obtain
that the money holding decision problem for a young buyer in the CM when the stock
of money is M can be rewritten as
max
m
{− φ(M)m + u(y(m, M ; )) + βφe+1(M)(m − d(m, M ; ))}. (12)
Defining the real interest as r = 1/β − 1 and the nominal interest rate i such that
1 + i = (1 + π )(1 + r), where π is such that 1 + π = φ(M)/φe+1(M), we can rewrite
(12) as
max
m
{− iβφe+1(M)m + u(y(m, M ; )) − βφe+1(M)d(m, M ; )}. (13)
DEFINITION 1. An equilibrium is a choice of money holdings mb(M) for young buyers
in the CM and terms of trade in the DM (y(m, M; ), d(m, M; )) such that (i) mb(M)
solves (13) and the money market clears, that is, mb(M) = 2M; and (ii) (y(m, M; ),
d(m, M; )) are as given in Lemma 1.
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The first-order condition for a buyer’s choice of money is
−iβφe+1(M) + y′(m, M ; )u′(y(m, M ; ))
− βφe+1(M)d ′(m, M ; ) ≤ 0, with equality if m > 0.
Bringing an additional unit of money in the DM costs (1 + i)βφe+1(M) in effort cost
in the current CM. This unit can be used to reduce effort by one unit in the next CM,
which then increases utility for a buyer in discounted terms by βφe+1(M). Hence, the
opportunity cost of carrying one more unit of money is iβφe+1(M). In addition, an
additional unit of money brought into the DM can enable the agent to purchase more
from the seller he is matched with if he desires to: he can obtain y′(m, M; ) more
units of good, which increases his utility by y′(m, M; )u′(y(m, M; )). The cost to
him, at the margin, is then βφe+1(M)d′(m, M; ), which is the discounted value to him
of the additional money transfer he made to obtain the extra quantity of good. From
our results regarding the terms of trade in the DM in Lemma 1, we obtain that
y′(m, M ; ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
βφe+1(M)

 ′(y; ) , if m < m
∗(M ; ),
0, otherwise,
and
d ′(m, M ; ) =
{
1, if m < m∗(M ; ),
0, otherwise.
We can thus rewrite the first-order condition as
−i +
[
u′(y)

 ′(y; ) − 1
]
· 1{m < m∗(M ; )} ≤ 0, equal if m > 0, (14)
where for the sake of notation the dependence of y on m, M and  has been dropped.
ASSUMPTION 1. For  ∈ (0, 1], (i) limy→0+ u′(y)/
 ′(y; ) = +∞; (ii) u′(y)/
 ′(y; )
is strictly decreasing in y for all y < y∗().10
From Assumption 1(i), the marginal gains from trade are infinite if buyers do not
bring any money into the DM because then they cannot purchase at all from sellers.
This ensures that no matter what the inflation rate is, buyers will bring money into the
DM, and therefore the first-order condition simply holds with equality.11 The lower
bound on i is 0, which corresponds to the Friedman rule, as this implies that the value
of money increases in expected terms at the rate of discount.
10. This is basically Assumption 1 from Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
11. This is a simplifying assumption. If limy→0 u′(y)/
 ′(y; ) = K finite, and Assumption 1(ii) holds,
then there exists a maximum i for which a monetary equilibrium exists.
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Assumption 1(ii), together with the relationship between y and m as given by the
terms of trade in the DM in Lemma 1, implies that a buyer’s objective function given
by (13) is strictly concave on the interval [0, m∗(M; )), and since y = y∗() for
m ≥ m∗(M; ), it is strictly decreasing thereafter for i > 0 and it is constant for i =
0.12 In fact, it is in general not possible to show that u′(y)/
 ′(y; ) is monotonically
decreasing in y. Sufficient conditions are θ  1; normalizing c(y) to be y, that u′ is
log-concave. Note that CRRA functions of the form u(y) = y1−σ /(1 − σ ), σ ∈ (0, 1),
deliver that for all  ∈ (0, 1], u′(y)/
 ′(y; ) is monotonically decreasing in y even
though u′ is not log-concave.13
It is clear that for all i > 0, m < m∗(M; ), which implies that (14) can be rewritten
as
i = u
′(y)

 ′(y; ) − 1. (15)
This equation yields the quantity y purchased in the DM, and the choice of money
holdings of a buyer is then given by βφe+1(M)m = 
(y; ). For i = 0, it turns out that
(15) is still the relevant condition.14 We then have the following lemma.
LEMMA 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. An equilibrium exists and is unique. (i) For
θ = 1 and i > 0, y < y∗(), and limi→0+ y = y∗(); (ii) When θ < 1, y ≤ y˜∗(; θ ) <
y∗() for all i ≥ 0, with limi→0+ y = y˜∗(; θ ), where y˜∗(; θ ) is the unique solution
to (15 ) for i = 0.
3.4 The Bargaining Inefficiency
Before moving on to analyzing the gains from a state-dependent monetary policy,
let us explain why there is a bargaining inefficiency that leads to the quantity of goods
traded in the DM as given in Lemma 2 to be inefficiently low.
To understand the inefficiency, let us focus on the case where buyers and sellers
have the same valuation of money, that is,  = 1, which corresponds to the case
12. This is because the second derivative of the objective function for m ∈ [0, m∗(M; )) is
βφe+1(M)
[
∂
∂y
(
u ′(y(m))

 ′(y(m); )
)]
y ′(m) = βφe+1(M)
[
∂
∂y
(
u ′(y(m))

 ′(y(m); )
)]
βφe+1(M)

 ′(y(m); ) ,
which is strictly negative if and only if u′(y)/
 ′(y; ) is strictly decreasing in y. For m ≥ m∗(M; ), we have
that y′(m, M; ) = d′(m, M; ) = 0, and therefore the first derivative of the objective function is simply
−βi ≤ 0.
13. Wright (2010) shows that even though there might be more than one solution to (15), generically
only one is a global maximizer, and therefore there is generically a unique solution to the maximization
problem of a buyer. His argument is developed in the LW framework with two subperiods and agents can
be either buyers or sellers in the DM. It turns out that our equation (15) is isomorphic to the FOC to his
equation (4), the differences being the presence of  in our equation, and for us the probability of a meeting
in the DM is 1.
14. See the proof of Lemma 2, which can be found in the technical appendix. Also, note that in this
case there are multiple equilibria, and we focus on the one that is the limit as i tends to zero.
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commonly seen in the literature.15 Lemma 2 establishes that when  = 1, unless
buyers have all the bargaining power and i is zero, so that it is costless to hold
money, the quantity of goods traded in the DM is strictly less than the quantity y∗
that maximizes the total instantaneous surplus u(y) − c(y). When θ < 1 and i > 0,
the quantity traded in the DM is less than y∗ because buyers do not bring enough
money into the DM. The reason for this is that when i > 0 buyers have to make a
costly investment in money holdings to bring to the DM, and when θ < 1 they do not
capture the entire return to their investment since sellers get a share of the surplus to
the trade. In this case, there is a hold-up problem. When θ < 1 and i = 0, although
it is still true that the quantity traded in the DM is less than y∗ because buyers do
not bring enough real balances into DM, the reason for this is not the existence of a
hold-up problem. In fact, as argued in Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007), when
the opportunity cost of holding money i is zero, the investment in real balances is
costless.16 Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller show in fact that the failure of buyers and
sellers to trade that quantity y∗ comes from the properties of Nash bargaining: the
surplus accruing to a buyer is not monotonic in the quantity of goods for all y ≤ y∗
and is maximized at y˜∗(1; θ ) < y∗.
To see this clearly, we can reformulate the maximization problem of buyers in
terms of a choice of how much goods to buy in the DM. In fact, as the terms of trade
for the DM obtained in Lemma 1 show, there is a bijection between the choice of
money holdings m in the CM and the quantity y a buyer purchases in the DM for m ≤
m∗(M; ). When the monetary rule followed by the monetary authority is a constant
and state-independent money stock growth rate, buyers and sellers value money the
same way, and we can thus rewrite the maximization problem (13) as
max
y
{−(1 + i)
(y; 1) + u(y)}.
There are three elements in this objective function. The first part is the opportunity
cost of holding money, which is i
(y; 1); the second part is 
(y; 1), which can be
interpreted either as the effort cost to the buyer in the current CM of bringing in
money into the DM, or as the cost of not having the money anymore in the next CM;
finally, a buyer obtains u(y) from his consumption in the DM. Assuming that i is
zero,17 so that holding money is costless, a buyer’s problem reduces to maximizing
his surplus
Sb(y; i = 0,  = 1) = (y)S(y),
15. When the monetary rule followed by the monetary authority delivers a constant value of money
across states, our model resembles closely the model of Rocheteau and Wright (2005). The only substantive
difference is that old sellers’ variation in marginal disutility of effort in the CM creates a variation in old
sellers’ consumption and effort, although this of no consequence for the DM.
16. Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007) highlight that the existence of a hold-up problem requires
several conditions to be satisfied: a costly irreversible investment, the inability to contract ex ante on this
investment, and bargaining over its returns.
17. This means money is withdrawn at the rate 1 − β.
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where S(y) = u(y) − c(y) is the total instantaneous surplus from trade in the DM, and
(y) = θu
′(y)
θu′(y) + (1 − θ )c′(y)
is the share of the surplus that goes to the buyer. It is easy to show that (y) is strictly
decreasing in y and that the surplus the buyer obtains from the DM trade peaks before
the total surplus for the DM peaks.18
4. BARGAINING INEFFICIENCY AND RISK SHARING
It is clear from our characterization of equilibrium that when the monetary authority
follows a state-independent monetary policy, money is not a very good hedging device
for sellers in the CM since its value is constant across states. If the monetary authority
switches from a monetary policy rule with  = 1 and i = i0 to a state-dependent policy
rule such that  < 1 and i = i0, which means that φ+1(γ (x = 1)M) < φe+1(M) <
φ+1(γ (x = 2)M), then money provides sellers with better hedging properties since
it is most valuable when sellers face a high marginal disutility of effort, which is in
state 2, and vice versa. And it turns out that this monetary policy rule switch can
induce an improvement of the terms of trade in the DM as well.
As a first step, note that for general values of  and i, the surplus to a buyer,
u(y) − (1 + i)
(y; ), can be re-expressed as
Sb(y; i, ) = (y)[S(y) + S˜(y; )] − i
(y; ), (16)
where
S˜(y; ) ≡ (−1 − 1)
(y; ). (17)
The surplus to the seller, −c(y) + −1
(y; ), can be re-expressed as
Ss(y, ) = [1 − (y)][S(y) + S˜(y; )]. (18)
Adding up the buyer’s and seller’s surpluses, we obtain that the total surplus to a
match is thus
ST (y; i, ) = S(y) + S˜(y; ) − i
(y; ). (19)
The first component of this surplus is S(y) = u(y) − c(y), the usual instantaneous
gains from trade from the DM.
18. Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007) show that bargaining rules that assign a fixed fraction of
the surplus to the buyer yield an efficient trading outcome.
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The second component S˜(y; ) = (1/ − 1)
(y; ) represents the gains resulting
from trade in the DM that are realized in the following CM. In fact, when money
changes hands in the DM, it goes from a buyer whose valuation of the money transfer
is 
(y; ) to a seller whose valuation of the same transfer is 
(y; )/, which is
strictly larger than 
(y; ) for  < 1. This is intuitive as  < 1 is obtained when
the inflation rate between successive CMs is low (high) when the state next period
is such that sellers have a high (low) disutility of effort in the CM, that is, money is
worth relatively more when sellers most need it. Hence, the money payment that a
buyer makes to a seller creates a surplus of (1/ − 1)
(y; ), and when inflation is
constant across states, that is,  = 1, this extra surplus is zero.
The last component of the total surplus is the cost of holding money −i
(y; ).
As can be seen from (16) and (18), the seller’s surplus does not depend on i and the
buyer bears the entire cost of holding money, which highlights where the hold-up
problem is.
4.1 Pareto Improving State-Dependent Monetary Policy
When the monetary policy rule induces relative valuations of money for buyers
and sellers such that  < 1, one can easily show using (17) that, for a given y, S˜(y; )
increases compared to the case where  = 1. This is no surprise as S˜(y; ) represents
the risk sharing gains in the next CM arising from trade in the DM. Moreover, the
cost of real balances, i
(y; ), decreases as well for a given y. This is also intuitive
as when  falls, the value that sellers attach to money increases (for a given i), and
therefore buyers need less real balances to purchase a given quantity of goods y. We
thus have that, for given y and i, the surplus to a buyer Sb(y; i, ) increases. The next
lemma establishes further that given a cost of real balances, it is possible to find a
state-dependent monetary policy inducing the “right”  in that the buyer’s surplus is
maximized at the quantity maximizing the instantaneous surplus from the DM.
LEMMA 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Given i ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1], there exists
∗(i, θ ) ∈ (0, θ /(θ + i)] such that the surplus of a buyer is maximized at y∗, with
∂∗(i, θ )/∂θ > 0, ∂∗(i, θ )/∂i < 0, and ∗(i, 1) = 1/(1 + i).
Lemma 3 establishes that it is possible for monetary policy to eliminate the bargain-
ing inefficiency in the DM when monetary policy is state-independent by switching
to a state-dependent monetary policy with  < 1, no matter how large the opportunity
cost of holding money i is, and no matter how large the bargaining inefficiency is (as
long as θ is not zero).
It turns out that this policy change to a state-dependent monetary policy with
 < 1 is also Pareto improving. Sellers are made strictly better off by the switch to a
state-dependent monetary policy with  = ∗(i, θ ) < 1. If we consider sellers’ surplus
Ss(y, ) = [1 − (y)][S(y) + S˜(y; )],
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S˜(y; ) increases as  goes from 1 to ∗(i, θ ) < 1, and both S(y) and S˜(y; ) increase
when the quantity traded in the DM increases from y < y∗ to y∗. And since (y)
decreases with y, the surplus of sellers is strictly greater when  = ∗(i, θ ) < 1 than
when  = 1. Buyers are also strictly better off, in expected terms. From the DM on
they are strictly better off as Sb(y; i, ) increases: Sb(y; i, ) is strictly decreasing in ,
so that the maximum surplus for ∗(i, θ ) < 1, which is obtained at y∗, must be strictly
greater than the maximum surplus for  = 1 (see Figure 2 ).
Furthermore, young buyers are indifferent between the two policies. Let us now
explain why, which also will enable us to explain in more detail the reason for the
increase in surplus for buyers and sellers. Young buyers’ effort in the CM is given
by hb(m, M, x) = q∗(1) + φ(M)m − Tbx . However, they hold all the money, so
mb(M) = 2M, and they always choose to bring the same amount of real balances
in the DM, so z ≡ φ(M)M is constant. Hence, their effort choice varies one-to-one,
but in opposite direction, with the real value of the transfer they receive. The real
value of the transfer received in state x when the stock of money last period was M−1
is Tbx = 2φ(γ (x)M−1)(γ (x) − 1)M−1 = 2z − 2φ(γ (x)M−1)M−1. Using the fact that
φ(γ (1)M−1) × γ (1)M−1 = φ(γ (2)M−1) × γ (2)M−1 = z, we have that
hb(2γ (x)M−1, γ (x)M−1, x) = q∗(1) + 2φ(γ (x)M−1)M−1. (20)
And since αφ(γ (1)M−1) + (1 − α)φ(γ (2)M−1) = φe(M−1), we obtain that the
expected value of effort for young buyers is q∗(1) + 2φe(M−1)M−1, which is con-
stant. Hence, a state-dependent monetary policy such that φ(γ (1)M−1) < φe(M−1) <
φ(γ (2)M−1) and αφ(γ (1)M−1) + (1 − α)φ(γ (2)M−1) = φe(M−1) implies that young
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workers are in expected terms as well off as when φ(γ (1)M−1) = φ(γ (2)M−1) =
φe(M−1) while young: they work more in state 2, but work less in state 1.
This variability in young’s buyers’ effort is what makes sellers strictly better off.
In fact, buyers give all their money to sellers in the DM, so when the stock of money
last period was M−1, the effort exerted by old sellers when the state is x is
ĥs(2M−1, γ (x)M−1, x) = q∗
(
ηsx
)− 2φ(γ (x)M−1)M−1, (21)
and their expected effort is thus q∗(ηsx) − 2φe(M−1)M−1. It appears from (20) and
(21) that the effort of old sellers and that of young buyers move in opposite directions
by the exact same quantity for a given state. When the state is x = 2, the central bank
injects less real balances than on average, and thus the money holdings of old sellers
is worth more than on average. This means they can purchase q∗(ηsx) with less effort.
At the same time young buyers receive a lower real transfer, which means that they
must work more to bring the usual amount of real balances into the DM. So, it is the
young buyers who produce for old sellers, and vice versa when the state is x = 1.
We term these gains from trade risk sharing in effort cost because they stem from a
risk in marginal effort cost that sellers face but buyers do not, so when the monetary
policy is state-dependent and  < 1, (young) buyers are in effect insuring (old) sellers.
Note that if buyers were to hold on to their money in the DM to bring into the CM then
there would be no additional gains from trade in the DM coming from risk sharing in
effort cost since old buyers do not face any risk in their cost of effort while old, and
thus there would not be any welfare gain by having young buyers’ effort vary with
the state to vary the effort of old sellers.
We summarize the above in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1. For any θ ∈ (0, 1], the allocation implied by the state-dependent
monetary policy such that i = i0 and  = ∗(i0, θ ) is Pareto improving, in expected
terms, over the allocation implied by the state-independent monetary policy inducing
i = i0.
Hence, we see that for a given opportunity cost of holding money i, when the
monetary policy changes from being state independent to being state dependent with
 = ∗(i, θ ), buyers’ welfare increases in expected terms because of gains in the DM,
and sellers’ welfare improves because of the better hedging properties of money. It
is important to note that the gains for sellers in the CM are what make the buyers’
gain possible.
It is also worth noting that for i = 0, we obtain
Sb(y∗; 0, ∗(0, θ )) = θ ST (y∗; 0, ∗(0, θ )), and
Ss(y∗; ∗(i, θ )) = (1 − θ )ST (y∗; 0, ∗(0, θ )),
that is, we obtain that at y∗ buyers get a fraction θ of the total surplus, and sellers get
a fraction 1 − θ .
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It is worth noting that if buyers were also facing a shock to their marginal cost of
effort when old as presented in the description of the environment in Section 1, the
results would not be affected. When a state-dependent monetary policy makes money
a better self-insurance tool for sellers, then either money becomes less attractive to
hold in the CM while old for buyers (when ηs1 ≤ η2b < 1 < ηb1 ≤ η2s), or money also
becomes a better hedging device for old buyers, but because the marginal effort cost
shock they face is not as variable as that of sellers, sellers still value money more than
buyers do (case where ηs1 < η1b < 1 < ηb2 < η2s). In either case buyers would spend
their entire money holdings in the DM, and the fact that they enter the last CM of
their lives without money means they are affected by the state-dependent monetary
policy only through the improved terms of trade in the DM.
4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, we characterize the optimal monetary policy; that is, we solve for
the choices of i and  that maximize welfare, where our measure of welfare is the
steady-state expected lifetime utility of an agent at birth before he knows whether
he will be a buyer or a seller. Since we focus on the case where the consumption
choices in each CM are independent of the monetary policy (because h is assumed
to be interior), monetary policy’s impact is on the effort choices in the CM and the
quantity traded in the DM, and therefore this is equivalent to maximizing the total
surplus ST (y; i, ) as given in (19), which can be rewritten as
ST (y; i, ) = −i
(y; ) + u(y) − c(y) + (−1 − 1)
(y; ).
In fact, each buyer bears a cost i
(y; ) of accumulating real balances in the CM of
the previous period. Then each buyer enjoys utility u(y) in the DM, while each seller
pays a utility cost of production c(y). Finally, the money transfer from a buyer to
seller means each seller leaves the DM with 
(y; ) worth of real balances, and this
transfer increases expected utility by (1/ − 1)
(y; ).
The monetary authority faces a Ramsey problem: it chooses i and  , taking into
account that buyers’ demand for real balances and the quantity of goods they will be
able to purchase in the DM y are affected by its decisions. The first-order conditions
to the Ramsey problem are
∂ST (y; i, )
∂i
+ ∂S
T (y; i, )
∂y
dy(i, )
di
≤ 0, = if i > 0, (22)
and
∂ST (y; i, )
∂
+ ∂S
T (y; i, )
∂y
dy(i, )
d
= 0, (23)
where y(i, ) is the optimal choice of consumption in the DM for buyers, given the
monetary policy rule (i, ). The first result is as follows.
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LEMMA 4. The optimal monetary policy rule is such that i = 0.
This result might seem obvious, but actually it is not. In fact, although it is true
that, everything else constant, i = 0 Pareto dominates any i > 0, when i changes, the
trade-off between the gains/loss in the DM and the risk sharing gains in the CM are
modified.
ASSUMPTION 2. For all θ ∈ (0, 1] and all  ≤ 1, dy(i, )/d < 0.
If we normalize the cost function to c(y) = y, a sufficient condition for Assumption
2 to hold is that u be such that for all y ≥ 0, −u(y)u′′(y)/[u′(y)]2 < 1.19
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. The optimal monetary
policy rule is such that i = 0 and  < 1, and implies y(i, ) > y∗.
This intuition for this result is simple. Given that the optimal monetary policy rule
is such that i = 0, there is a unique trade-off for the monetary authority in choosing
the optimal value for . This trade-off is between the quantity y to be traded in the
DM, which contributes to the total surplus to the tune of u(y) − c(y), and the risk
sharing gains (1/ − 1)
(y; ). Under Assumption 2, since y increases as  falls, both
buyers and sellers benefit when  falls below one, up to the point where y reaches the
quantity y∗, which maximizes the instantaneous surplus in the DM.If  falls further,
the quantity produced in the DM goes beyond the quantity y∗, which then reduces
the instantaneous surplus from the DM compared to y∗, but since more is traded
in the DM more real balances are transferred, and the risk sharing gains in the next
CM increase. However, since y∗ maximizes the instantaneous surplus in the DM, by
the envelope theorem we have that the cost of marginally increasing the y beyond y∗
is zero, whereas the risk sharing gains are strictly positive. The monetary authority’s
optimal policy is therefore to choose  such that the marginal cost in the DM equals
the marginal risk sharing gains in the CM.20
19. A less stringent sufficient condition is
− u(y)u
′′(y)
[u ′(y)]2 <
1
1 − θ .
For a CRRA-type utility function u(y) = y1−σ /(1 − σ ), with σ ∈ (0, 1), this condition is
σ
1 − σ <
1
1 − θ ,
which for σ ≤ 0.5 is true for all θ ∈ (0, 1].
20. These results hold in this exact form as long as we have interiority of h in each state. Similar results
would hold if a corner solution were to be reached for one of the two states, but the expressions would
then be messier.
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5. CONCLUSION
We have shown that in an environment where the two roles of money as means of
payment and store of value are disentangled, it is possible to obtain that the efficient
quantity is traded in decentralized markets even when the terms of trade are deter-
mined by Nash bargaining. This is made possible by the improved hedging properties
of money that an appropriate state-dependent policy creates. Hence, although the two
roles of money are not exercised simultaneously, it is the improved role of money as
a store of value that improves money’s role as a means of payment.
Although our analysis was carried out with money as the only asset, it is possible to
introduce another asset like a Lucas tree. We have shown in another paper Jacquet and
Tan (2011) that if the Lucas tree pays a state-dependent dividend that is negatively
correlated with sellers’ disutility of effort, then, as long as inflation is not too high,
money is the only means of payment used, and the asset is used by buyers to transfer
resources across centralized markets. This is because sellers prefer money to the
asset relatively more than buyers, and therefore it is more advantageous for buyers
to use money as a means of payments than the Lucas tree. This implies that the main
results of the present paper would still go through with the introduction of a second
asset.
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